Phaedrus
Phaedrus: (as Lysias, so far)
around (peri)
my circumstances (pragmata)
you know (epistomai)
and what i believe (nomizein)
to be bringing together (sumpherein)
for us
these (pragmata)
having come to be (gignomai)
you have heard (akouein)
and i deem it (axioein)
un(-fitting)
to lack these (pragmata?)
by way of this miss-
happening (a-tuchein)
that i do not happen (ouk tugchanein)
to be being (on)
your lover (erastes)
//
//
banded sea krait or
the great cartographer
general administer of
these
//
Lysias at the beach
in so deep shade those eyes
against the slivering salt
a nose by greasy telescope
for seashell circumstance
burnrise like blood under the skin
slow sting of a swollen onion
behind the slanted brim
and belly-teeth of a sunhat
a braided tongue is licking
your inner ear
//
haggis interruptus, she said!?
that dizzy Lyzzias, and oh,
yes, and
the zest
Phaedrus: (cont.) and what i believe to be bringing together (sumpherein) for us, these having come to be, you have heard
// 230ε
καὶ ὡς νομίζω συμφέρειν ἡμῖν γενομένων τούτων ἀκήκοας
//
sumpherein means literally to bring together; used impersonally as here, it means to be useful or advantageous
//
Phaedrus: (cont., as Lysias) about my circumstances (pragmata), you know
// 230ε
περὶ μὲν τῶν ἐμῶν πραγμάτων ἐπίστασαι
//
Socrates: (cont.) and you, in whatever pose (schema) you suppose is easiest to read
// 230δ
σὺ δ᾽ ἐν ὁποίῳ σχήματι οἴει ῥᾷστα ἀναγνώσεσθαι
//
schema means form, shape, figure (in dance, geometry, etc.), appearance, manner, posture (athletic, military), character, role, dress.
the word for “to read” is anagignoskein, which shares a root with suggignoskein; it means literally to know again or to recognize, i.e., to recognize the written words.
& reading is done outloud
//
Socrates: (cont.) i seem to me about to lie down
// 230δ
ἐγὼ μέν μοι δοκῶ κατακείσεσθαι
//
dokein has a range of meanings (to seem, to expect, to imagine, to opine, including colloquial use with senses of seeming fitness, seemly-ness, or decided-upon-ness), permitting many translations. Here, re-iterated first-person pronouns, in the nominative (ego, which is extra performative in AG) and dative (moi) cases, fold an active-voice verb (conjugated for indicative or subjunctive mood) into a dramatized and hypothetical middle voice. The verb is doing three-ish things at once —
expressing internal seeming
gesturing approval
conditioning commitment
At the same time, the infinitive katakeisesthai (middle voice, to lie down) is in future tense, which is impossible to translate neatly into English. Here, the meaning seems less about abstract futurity and more about intention-in-formation. So the subject is watching itself decide to be on the brink of lying down. Lying down is (in turn) an embodied passivity. The speech isn’t a demonstration of self-as-self-knowledge, but something strangely analogous: a demonstration of self-as-self-seeming in its self-conditioned intention to release embodied intention.
Leaving an aphoristic original and inherently unstable translation —
i seem to me about to lie down
i pretend to me (i) will lie down
i seem seemly for me to lie down
i seem (good) to me to lie down
i opine it (fit) for me to lie down
i resolve for myself to lie down
i feel to me like lying down
methinks i shall lie down
i expect for me to lie down
i imagine myself about to lie down
i dream myself about to lie down
oopsie, i’m about to lie down
etc.
//
Socrates: (cont.) so you, stretching out speeches (logos) before me in scrolls (biblion), appear ready to lead me around (periagein) all of Attica and wherever else you wish
// 230δ
σὺ ἐμοὶ λόγους οὕτω προτείνων ἐν βιβλίοις τήν τε Ἀττικὴν φαίνῃ περιάξειν ἅπασαν καὶ ὅποι ἂν ἄλλοσε βούλῃ
//
treating emoi (to/for/by me) as a dative of agent makes possible an alternate translation -
so you, stretching out speeches by me in scrolls, appear ready to bring me around all of Attica and wherever else you wish
//
yesterday i translated thremmata as goats; but it could mean any kind of kept animal, including human slaves
Socrates: (cont.) you however seem to me to have found the drug (pharmakon) of my exodus
// 230δ
σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον ηὑρηκέναι
//
consistere
psst — the monsters are all in evidence over here
many with their sights on you, can you not see them?
maybe they don’t wear chaos like your command
or ugliness as your specification; maybe in love
they can’t afford to show the truth; some have been known
to flatter relentlessly the passing beauty; or even
to dress up as their own negation, pretending tools
or fancy chairs or helpless little girls; and many
renouncing love or beauty altogether; but nobody
is sorry; nobody knows that everybody
is swallowed up by someone by the end; and nobody
is more monstrous than mercy, or more self-same
still; if you want it darker, we can totally kill the flame
but the poet will kill it for us in six or seven lines
//
xox
Socrates: (cont.)
now then the spaces (chorion)
and the trees
are not at all willing (ethelein)
to teach me (didaskein)
// 230δ
τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μ᾽ ἐθέλει διδάσκειν
//
Socrates: (cont.) for i am a lover of learning (philomathes)
// 230δ
φιλομαθὴς γάρ εἰμι
//
Love here is philos rather than eros; philomathes (from philos + manthanein) could be either an adjective or a verb, rendering alternative translations,
for i am a lover of learning
for i am (you) love learning
like a Socratic Tetragrammaton.
This is the speech, written by Lysias, that Phaedrus is about to read; Phaedrus also references Socrates' special interest in erotics (e.g. Symposium 177d).
There’s a notable comparison between suggignoskein (to think together) and charizein (to gratify), whose meanings could somehow overlap (to agree with, to forgive, to share a feeling); whereas Socrates (lover?) asks for the first, Lysias' speech will be about the latter (for a non-lover).
The sheer amount left implicit in the conversation about love (and desire, and sexuality, as subject to persuasion, as coercion, as predatory, as abuse, in a culture of abuse, etc. etc., as experiment, as play, as care, as friendship, as sacred, as true) (and as poetry) really baffled me when i first encountered the dialogue (>25 years ago). But if Phaedrus has a unifying theme, perhaps it would be this — the power of the unspoken.
//
Socrates: think together with me (suggignosko), O best one
// 230δ
συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὦ ἄριστε
//
suggignosko, from sun (together) + gignosko (to be aware of, perceive, observe, know, learn, discern, observe, judge, determine, think, know carnally, have sex with), carries a variety of implications, to think with or agree with, also to acknowledge, to confess, to make allowances for, to forgive, etc., similar to Latin conscience; many possible meanings here, intimacy implied —
think together with me
agree with me
share thoughts with me
acknowledge me
learn with me
observe with me
confess to me
share a feeling with me
understand me
recognize me
forgive me
know me
know me together
//
basically a marriage proposal