Dialogue
Socrates: (cont.) and you, in whatever pose (schema) you suppose is easiest to read
// 230δ
σὺ δ᾽ ἐν ὁποίῳ σχήματι οἴει ῥᾷστα ἀναγνώσεσθαι
//
schema means form, shape, figure (in dance, geometry, etc.), appearance, manner, posture (athletic, military), character, role, dress.
the word for “to read” is anagignoskein, which shares a root with suggignoskein; it means literally to know again or to recognize, i.e., to recognize the written words.
& reading is done outloud
//
Socrates: (cont.) i seem to me about to lie down
// 230δ
ἐγὼ μέν μοι δοκῶ κατακείσεσθαι
//
dokein has a range of meanings (to seem, to expect, to imagine, to opine, including colloquial use with senses of seeming fitness, seemly-ness, or decided-upon-ness), permitting many translations. Here, re-iterated first-person pronouns, in the nominative (ego, which is extra performative in AG) and dative (moi) cases, fold an active-voice verb (conjugated for indicative or subjunctive mood) into a dramatized and hypothetical middle voice. The verb is doing three-ish things at once —
expressing internal seeming
gesturing approval
conditioning commitment
At the same time, the infinitive katakeisesthai (middle voice, to lie down) is in future tense, which is impossible to translate neatly into English. Here, the meaning seems less about abstract futurity and more about intention-in-formation. So the subject is watching itself decide to be on the brink of lying down. Lying down is (in turn) an embodied passivity. The speech isn’t a demonstration of self-as-self-knowledge, but something strangely analogous: a demonstration of self-as-self-seeming in its self-conditioned intention to release embodied intention.
Leaving an aphoristic original and inherently unstable translation —
i seem to me about to lie down
i pretend to me (i) will lie down
i seem seemly for me to lie down
i seem (good) to me to lie down
i opine it (fit) for me to lie down
i resolve for myself to lie down
i feel to me like lying down
methinks i shall lie down
i expect for me to lie down
i imagine myself about to lie down
i dream myself about to lie down
oopsie, i’m about to lie down
etc.
//
Socrates: (cont.) so you, stretching out speeches (logos) before me in scrolls (biblion), appear ready to lead me around (periagein) all of Attica and wherever else you wish
// 230δ
σὺ ἐμοὶ λόγους οὕτω προτείνων ἐν βιβλίοις τήν τε Ἀττικὴν φαίνῃ περιάξειν ἅπασαν καὶ ὅποι ἂν ἄλλοσε βούλῃ
//
treating emoi (to/for/by me) as a dative of agent makes possible an alternate translation -
so you, stretching out speeches by me in scrolls, appear ready to bring me around all of Attica and wherever else you wish
//
yesterday i translated thremmata as goats; but it could mean any kind of kept animal, including human slaves
Socrates: (cont.) you however seem to me to have found the drug (pharmakon) of my exodus
// 230δ
σὺ μέντοι δοκεῖς μοι τῆς ἐμῆς ἐξόδου τὸ φάρμακον ηὑρηκέναι
//
Socrates: (cont.)
now then the spaces (chorion)
and the trees
are not at all willing (ethelein)
to teach me (didaskein)
// 230δ
τὰ μὲν οὖν χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδέν μ᾽ ἐθέλει διδάσκειν
//
Socrates: (cont.) for i am a lover of learning (philomathes)
// 230δ
φιλομαθὴς γάρ εἰμι
//
Love here is philos rather than eros; philomathes (from philos + manthanein) could be either an adjective or a verb, rendering alternative translations,
for i am a lover of learning
for i am (you) love learning
like a Socratic Tetragrammaton.
This is the speech, written by Lysias, that Phaedrus is about to read; Phaedrus also references Socrates' special interest in erotics (e.g. Symposium 177d).
There’s a notable comparison between suggignoskein (to think together) and charizein (to gratify), whose meanings could somehow overlap (to agree with, to forgive, to share a feeling); whereas Socrates (lover?) asks for the first, Lysias' speech will be about the latter (for a non-lover).
The sheer amount left implicit in the conversation about love (and desire, and sexuality, as subject to persuasion, as coercion, as predatory, as abuse, in a culture of abuse, etc. etc., as experiment, as play, as care, as friendship, as sacred, as true) (and as poetry) really baffled me when i first encountered the dialogue (>25 years ago). But if Phaedrus has a unifying theme, perhaps it would be this — the power of the unspoken.
//
Socrates: think together with me (suggignosko), O best one
// 230δ
συγγίγνωσκέ μοι, ὦ ἄριστε
//
suggignosko, from sun (together) + gignosko (to be aware of, perceive, observe, know, learn, discern, observe, judge, determine, think, know carnally, have sex with), carries a variety of implications, to think with or agree with, also to acknowledge, to confess, to make allowances for, to forgive, etc., similar to Latin conscience; many possible meanings here, intimacy implied —
think together with me
agree with me
share thoughts with me
acknowledge me
learn with me
observe with me
confess to me
share a feeling with me
understand me
recognize me
forgive me
know me
know me together
//
basically a marriage proposal
Phaedrus: (cont.)
for artlessly (a-technos)
as you say
you have looked like some guided stranger (xenageein)
and not of the country (epi-chorios)
// 230ξ
ἀτεχνῶς γάρ ὃ λέγεις ξεναγουμένῳ τινὶ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιχωρίῳ ἔοικας
//
Socrates: by Hera, it is a beautiful resting place
this platanos tree is hugely wide-spreading (amphilaphes) and high (uphelos); and of the chaste tree, the height and the dense shade are entirely beautiful; and as she holds on (echein) to the cusp (akme) of her full bloom, she supplies such a sweet-smelling place; and also the graceful stream is flowing under the platanos tree with exceedingly cool water, by the witness (tekmairomai) of my foot
and by the girls and the statues it seems to be the temple (hieros/hieron) for some kind of Nymphs and of Achelous; and again, if you wish, the good breath (eupnous) of the place, how sufficient (agapeton) and violently pleasurable (sphodros hedu) it is; summery and clear, it responds to the chorus of cicadas; and most subtle (kompsos) of all is the grass, that it has grown (phuein) in gently to the steep slope, sufficient to hold, for one who has laid down their head, altogether beautifully
so it has been the best stranger guide for you, O beloved Phaedrus
Socrates: so it has been the best stranger guide for you, O beloved Phaedrus
// 230ξ
ὥστε ἄριστά σοι ἐξενάγηται, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε
//
Socrates: (cont.) that it has grown (phuein) in gently to the steep slope, sufficient to hold, for one who has laid down their head, altogether beautifully
// 230ξ
ὅτι ἐν ἠρέμα προσάντει ἱκανὴ πέφυκε κατακλινέντι τὴν κεφαλὴν παγκάλως ἔχειν
//
of all
the most subtle
that of the grass
that in gently
to the steep
sufficient has grown
for one who laid down their head
altogether beautifully
to hold
//
Socrates: (cont.) and again, if you wish, the good breath (eupnous) of the place, how sufficiently amicable (agapeton) and violently pleasurable (sphodros hedu) it is
// 230ξ
εἰ δ᾽ αὖ βούλει, τὸ εὔπνουν τοῦ τόπου ὡς ἀγαπητὸν καὶ σφόδρα ἡδύ
//
This resists translation and contains a noetic pleasure puzzle.
Eu + pnous, literally good breath, figuratively good breeze, seems to be a pun or wordplay on eu + nous, which would mean good intellect. The other two predicates — agapeton and sphodros hedu — are a pair of nearly conflicting pleasures. Agapeton describes a moderate and measured affection, whereas sphodros hedu describes a kind of pleasure (intense, vehement, violent) that lacks measure and is infinite; see Philebus 52c.
The hint is that the place itself (tou topou) possesses something akin to intelligence, or something akin to a soul, which can provide both finite and infinite pleasures, and perhaps inspires both finite and infinite love or desire. But only, he specifies, if you wish.
//